Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic: Implications for Nordic countries and recommended policy responses

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia and China pledged to strengthen their cooperation in the Arctic. This report examines the prospects for increased collaboration between Russia and China in the region, focusing on energy, critical minerals, shipping, military and security issues, and governance.
The main consequence of increased Sino-Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic is that revenue from Chinese energy imports is fueling Russia's war economy. However, Chinese partners have paused participation in a flagship Russian energy project, highlighting the limitations of the energy partnership. To reduce Russian revenues from Arctic energy exports, western governments should focus on enforcing and monitoring existing sanctions.
While there are signs of increased collaboration on the mining and processing of critical minerals, a "critical mineral alliance" between the two countries is unlikely. Nordic countries should work to reduce their reliance on China by enhancing EU cooperation and developing supplementary supply chains and processing capacity.
Increased Russian energy shipments to China via the Northern Sea Route heighten the risk of an oil spill, as sanctions have led Russia to use less safe vessels. Nordic countries should continue to support the resumption of Arctic Council working group activities and consider additional sanctions on Russia's shadow fleet.
China and Russia's joint military exercises in the Arctic appear to be mainly posturing aimed at deterring the US and its allies. The main military threat to Nordic countries in the Arctic currently comes from Russia.
Arctic governance remains a point of friction between Russia and China. By continuing to support the existing governance framework, Nordic countries can leverage this friction and confine some aspects of Sino-Russian cooperation to regional multilateral bodies.