Religious Regulations Tighten for Uyghurs

The Chinese government’s revised regulations in East Turkistan (Xinjiang) tighten controls over the religious practices of the predominantly Muslim ethnic Uyghurs, Human Rights Watch said today.
The revisions, effective February 1, 2024, focus on “Sinicizing” religions, a government priority under President Xi Jinping since 2016 to make places of worship and religious teachings better reflect Han Chinese culture and Chinese Communist Party ideology. Many of the 2024 revisions appear to bring East Turkistan’s regulatory framework in line with restrictions in national laws and regulations adopted since 2014.
Under the 2024 regulations, religions must “practice the core values of socialism” and “adhere to the direction of Sinicization of religions” (article 5). Whether places of worship are being “built, renovated, expanded, or rebuilt,” they should “reflect Chinese characteristics and style in terms of architecture, sculptures, paintings, decorations, etc.” (article 26). The revisions also impose new requirements before religious institutions can apply to create places of worship (article 20), as well as more stringent restrictions and cumbersome approval processes for building, expanding, altering and moving places of worship (articles 22 and 25).
The “Sinicization” of religions, however, goes beyond controlling the appearance, number, location and size of religious venues, Human Rights Watch said. Places of worship must also “deeply excavate the content of [religious] teachings and canons that are conducive to social harmony … and interpret them in line with the requirements of contemporary China's development and progress, and in line with the excellent traditional Chinese culture” (article 11).
The 2024 revisions empower grassroots Communist Party cadres to monitor society. Cadres in “village committees” and “neighborhood committees” must report to the religious authorities if they discover “illegal religious organizations, illegal preachers, illegal religious activities, or the use of religion to interfere in grassroots public affairs” (article 7). These surveillance powers at low levels characterizes the repression particularly in East Turkistan (Xinjiang) and Tibet, in accordance with Xi’s “mass mobilization” style of governance and social control, a style that Chinese state media typically says is inspired by Mao Zedong’s “Fengqiao experience.”
https://www.hrw.org/