NATO and its Indo-Pacific Partners

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and increasing security concerns in the Taiwan Strait have Atlantic and Pacific democracies ever more concerned about their security and defense.

For decades, the security theaters for both oceans have largely been separate, and the policy and expert communities working on each have often competed rather than cooperated. But this gap is beginning to close. Russia’s aggression, its closer ties with China, and the malicious actions undertaken by both in democracies worldwide, are bringing those democracies closer.

NATO has four partners in the Indo-Pacific: Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. According to its 2022 strategic concept, the alliance seeks to develop deeper ties with this quartet “to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests”. The partnerships are growing more substantive through increased high-level consultations, including the participation of the four countries’ political leaders at last year’s NATO summit in Madrid and more formalized cooperation, such as discussions about a NATO office in Tokyo.

The alliance’s upcoming Vilnius summit seeks to go beyond the significant commitments made in Madrid and establish agreement on concrete measures that deepen NATO’s ability to address the increasingly challenging global environment. A promising area for progress lies in partnerships with the Indo-Pacific.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought together in April leading experts from the Indo-Pacific with NATO experts and officials to identify areas for deeper cooperation. The conference did just that, noting the importance of joint action on countering cyber threats and setting standards for emerging disruptive technologies, improving policy consultation and information exchange, and expanding learning through NATO’s Centers of Excellence network. But given the high stakes of deeper Atlantic-Pacific cooperation, participants were wary of overstating ambitions.

Organizing Principles of Cooperation

The desire for cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners is great, as are the stakes. At the same time, allies are concerned about protecting NATO’s core mission of deterrence and defense. They are also eager to avoid potential overreach and misperceptions about the intentions of cooperation.

For deeper partnership between NATO and the Indo-Pacific partners to be successful, the areas and scope of cooperation need to be defined by organizing principles:

Given their geopolitical importance, the tasks NATO and its partners assume should lay a solid foundation for relationships that are valued and will grow. Moonshots with high likelihoods of failure are to be avoided. Concrete and efficient initial projects are preferrable.

Areas of partnership should address a need that NATO and its partners can meet quickly and that would otherwise not be fulfilled. Where cooperation seeks to develop something new, such as capabilities or standards, the approach must improve efficiency and security for all involved.

Partnership needs to be efficient and financially sustainable given available resources. This may limit cooperation in certain areas, such as space, which requires significant investment.

Cooperation that addresses economic coercion and other sub-threshold threats touches on areas often covered by other multilateral or bilateral formats. NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners must work to complement and cooperate with other bodies, especially the EU, and they should select the format with the best reputation for addressing a given concern.

Cooperation can reinforce the rules-based order against the threat posed by digital authoritarianism. The bedrock of common values should underscore partnerships. It will, however, be necessary to remain open to cooperating with like- and similar-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. A comparable attitude of openness to the public at large is needed to dispel any attempt to label cooperation as untransparent.

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